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THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
REFLECTIONS ON SOME THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
JOEL MEYER
The fear of acts which disrupt social equilibrium
has inspired the imposition of punishment by
those who have the power to e.tablish and enforce
the desired standards of conduct. Punishment has
developed from the infliction of pain in revenge
to the use of science to rehabilitate, so that there
is considerable disparity between what has
historically been called punishment' and the
current methods of coercing conformity and dealing
with offenders. For the purpose of this Comment
the term punishment, unless distinguished, will be
defined as the method which society uses to enforce
the desired standards of conduct and methods of
dealing with the offender after a crime has been
committed. This definition includes the use of
torture, imprisonment and treatment.
Retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation have
been called the aims or justifications for punish-
ment. While they all involve to some 'extent
suffering and deprivation of freedom these are
primary in retribution and deterrence; the primary
emphasis 'of rehabilitation being treatment. For
retributive and deterrent purposes, the nature of
the crime determines the type of punishment,
while the personality of, the offender determines
the type of treatment meant to rehabilitate.
The motives for the infliction of punishment are
1 Punishment has been historically defined as an
infliction of evil, pain or deprivation of good. Jerome
Hall has defined punishment as:
First, punishment is a privation (evil, pain,
disvalue). Second, it is coercive. Third," it is
inflicted in the name of the State; it is authorized.
Fourth, punishment presupposes rules, their
violation, and more or less formal determination
of that expressed in a' judgment. Fifth, it is
inflicted upon an offender who has committed a
harm and this presupposes a set of values by
reference to which oth the harm and punishment'
are ethically significant. Sixth, the extent or type
of punishment is in some defended way related to.
the commission of the harm, and aggravated or
mitigated by reference to the personality of the
offender, his motive and temptation.
Hobbes defined punishment as an evil inflicted by public
authority on the person who has been judged by the
same authority as a transgressor of law, so that the will
of men may be disposed to obedience. Swartz, Punish-
inent and Treatment of Offenders 16 BurrAIo L. RZv.
368 (1967). Jeremy Bentham defined punishment as
an evil resulting to an individual from direct intention
of another, on account of some act that appears to
have been done or omitted. It is an evil, a physical evil;
either a pain or a loss of pleasure. J. BENTmA, RA-
TIONALE OF PUNMsMMNT (1830).
dependent upon custom, tradition, level of knowl-
edge, and social and economic conditions. As
society develops, gaining more understanding of
crime 'and its causes, it changes its beliefs about
the most effective method to discourage undesired
conduct and encourage socially acceptable be-
havior. There is no unanimous acceptance of any
of the goals of punishment. Each has been praised
and criticized. The purpose of this comment is to
analyze the various' goals to determine the validity
of each in our present society.
RETr, iTioN
The instinctive reaction to' criminal acts is
retaliation by the iiijured person. It is vengeance, a
way of releasing and expressing hostility towards
the criminal and his conduct. Primitive man,
lollowing his basic instinct ,of self-preservation,
retaliated against those who injured him or his
possessions. Retaliation by. the victim was im-
mediate and savage. He demanded punishment in
kind, and the inher peace of the victim was not
restored until the wrongdoer had been made to
suffer. Originally'punishment was an ,indivAdual
responsibility, but as society developed, 'this
type of personal vengeance could no longer be
tolerated and the individual was forced to re-
linquish his right to deal persoiallyi with the
malefactor, in return for-a promise by society to
punish the criminal. Retribution was exacted by
attributing to the community collectively the
resentment .and, anger, of the wronged individual.
The feelings of the injured party were slibordinated
to society's interest of punishing the offender.
Retribution is neither an enforced expiation
intended to eliminate th& evil from man, nor
punishment to deter, but is aimed at restoring
equilibrium.2 To accomplish this end, punishment
2 Aristotle advocated punishment to restore'social
equilibrium. He stated:
The law looks only to the difference created by
the injury and treats men as previously equal,
where the one does, and the other suffers injury
... and so this unjust, being unequal, the judge
endeavors to reduce to equality again because
when one party has been wounded and the other
has struck him... the suffering and the doing are
divided into equal shares; well, the judge tries to
restore equality by penalty and thereby taking the
gain. ARusror.E, Erncs, Bx. V. 112 (E. P. Dutton
-1968] ,
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should be swift and equivalent to the crime itself,
without consideration of mitigating factors such
as provocation, poverty, age, and mental re-
sponsibility.' This has been criticized as a justifica-
tion for punishment for it places the punisher on
the same moral and ethical level as the wrongdoer.
4
The violator is condemned as a murderer and is
sentenced to death. The state executes the wrong-
doer, but in so doing commits the same moral wrong
as did the murderer. Can two wrongs make a
right? Is not society guilty of the crime for which
it has condemned? This criticism has been answered
on two grounds.5 First the detriment imposed by
society upon the wrongdoer is not defined as a
crime because it has not been committed in viola-
tion of a legislative prohibition. On the contrary, it
is imposed in conformity with the commands of
of society. Second, the punishment imposed by the
law is for the benefit of society, not its detriment.
Except in cases involving abhorrent crimes, the
community is not moved by resentment. Retribu-
tion then no longer serves the purpose of vengeance,
but becomes an outlet for our own anti-social
aggressiveness. The criminal serves as a scapegoat.
Professor Sutherland has suggested:
The criminal thus becomes the handy scapegoat
upon which he (ordinary citizen) can transfer his
feeling of his own tendency to sinfulness and thus
by punishing the criminals he deludes himself into
a feeling of righteous indignation, thus, bolstering
up his own self respect and serving in this round-
about way, both to restrain himself from like
indulgences to keep himself upon the path of cul-
tural progress.6
Using punishment to satisfy emotions, either
for vengeance or to satisfy aggressive instincts,
gives only temporary satisfaction with no lasting
effect. The original wrong is not corrected, for
punishment does not give life back to the murdered
victim, or the money back to the robbery victim.
Using the criminal as a scapegoat only creates
further hostility between the criminal and society
which may result in future injury to the whole
community. Retribution also fails to recognize
& Co. ed. 1950) quoted in Privette, Theories of
Punishment, 29 U.K.C.L. Rnv. 76 (1958).
3 SuTBERLAND AND CPESEy, PRINCIPLES Or CRnII-
NOLOGY (1960).
4 Leopold, What is Wrong With the Prison System, 45
NEB. L. Rv.36 (1966).
5 Mueller, Punishment, Correction and the Law, 45
NuB. L. REv.58 (1966).
6 Su'= iND, supra note 3 at 302.
that all persons who commit crimes are not free
agents, but to some extent are at the mercy of
environmental factors. Punishment should not
only serve as an emotional release for society, but
should also help the individual.
DETERRENCE
Deterrence is the use of punishment to prevent
the offender from repeating his offense and to
demonstrate to other potential offenders what
will happen to them if they follow the wrongdoer's
example. It was first advocated by Plato:
No one punishes a wrongdoer on account of his
wrongdoing unless one takes unreasoning venge-
ance like a wild beast. But he who undertakes to
punish with reason does not avenge himself for the
past offense since he cannot make what was done as
though it never came to pass; he looks to the future
and aims at preventing that particular person and
others who see him punished from doing wrong
again.
During the nineteenth century, a theory of
punishment was developed which stated that life
is regulated by calculating the pleasures and pains
involved in contemplated actions, and that the
aim of punishment was to increase the pain over
the pleasure of the act to deter the contemplated
act. Punishment tipped the scale towards desired
conduct.8
The essential question to be asked in referrence
to deterrence is its effectiveness. If it were 100%
effective, there would be no crime. But studies
show that new persons enter into the life of crime
and that convicts return to their criminal ways.9
If deterrence works, it follows that the more severe
the punishment, the more effective it would be.
But again, studies have shown that there is no
evidence that the abolition of the death penalty
has ever produced an increase in the murder rate,
or that restoration of the penalty has ever caused a
decrease. 10 But it is not the severity and incon-
7 Privette, supra note 2, at 57.
8 Id. at 76.
9 In Eastern Pennsylvania Penitentiary 67% were
repeat offenders, 70% in Massachusetts, 80% in New
York, 63% in Michigan, and 80% in Louisiana; 45
NEB. L. REv.604 (1966). But statistical studies are not
completely accurate, for there is no way of measuring
the rate of recidivism had there been no punishment, or
the number of persons who never entered into the life of
crime because of their fear of punishment.
'0ROYAL COMsnSSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMINT,
1949-53, REPORT, par. 65. See also Void, Extent and
[Vol. 59
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venience of punishment alone which deters, but
also the moral condemnation of the community
which most persons wish to avoid. People's
respect for the legal ideology and its administra-
tion may determine the effectiveness of deterrent
punishments~n
Certainty of punishment and detection may
deter the normal person who thinks about his
actions and the consequences, but the criminal
mind does not operate like a normal mind. The
criminal often acts irrespective of the consequences,
learning little from experience and living for the
present. Deterrence fails in crimes of emotion and
passion, or in acts governed by greed, impulse or
fear. When the criminal seeks punishment from a
sense of guilt, or considers punishment as the
collection by society of its due, or desires punish-
ment to take him out of the "rat race of. life,"
deterrence is of no effect.1 2 Deterrence also fails
when the offender does not recognize the accepted
standards of conduct and considers violation of the
standards his duty and responsibility.
Often punishment, instead of deterring, develops
a sense of caution in the criminal. He will think
twice before he repeats the crime, not to refrain
from acting, but to contrive methods of evading
the punishment or detection.'2 In this way,
punishment has not reformed the criminal, but
has taught him the necessity of developing practices
to evade detection. The hope of escaping justice
may be a stronger feeling than the fear of pain.
Deterrence is an advertisement of punishment
to effect fear in the potential criminal. Thus
punishing the innocent can serve the purposes of
such a system as easily as punishing the guilty. It
is questionable whether a criminal should be
punished in excess of his just desserts, merely for
the benefit of those potential criminals who in the
absence of such extra punishment might them-
selves commit a crime. There is a limit to which a
criminal can be used to benefit society at large.
14
Why should X be punished to deter the conduct of
Y? This makes the punished criminal a martyr.
Trend of Capital Crimes in the United States, ANwALs,
Nov. 1952, p.1.
1 Andenees, General Prevention-Illusion or Realty
43 3. Can. L.C. & P.S. 176 (1952). He suggests that
punishment has three sorts of preventive effects: 1)
the deterrent effect; 2) the strengthening of moral
inhibitions; and 3) the stimulation of habitual law
abiding conduct.
"2 Leopold, supra note 4 at 77.
13 SUTHERLAND, supra note 3 at 288.
14 Alexander, Philosophy of Punishment, 13 J. CRat.
L.C. & P.S. 235 (1922).
RE].ABIMITATION
Rehabilitation is punishment based on psy-
chology and sociology of crime. The ideal of
rehabilitation is to return the offender to society
neither embittered nor resolved to get even for his
degradation and suffering, but possessing a new set
of values and morals and a desire to contribute to
society. During the Middle Ages, the Church
advocated the use of punishment to aid the
individual in cleansing himself of sins.j Punish-
ment became a source of interior purification,
repentance and redemption. As society has gained
more knowledge of crime and the criminal, it has
been recognized that many criminals who are
emotionally disturbed or products of environment
require thoughtful, individual and positive treat-
ment.
Rehabilitation is motivated by a belief in the
worth and dignity of every person and a willing-
ness of society to expend its time and energy to
reclaim him for his own sake, not merely to keep
him from again harming society. It is a difficult
process and cannot perform miracles. There are
those who are not suited for treatment. It requires
a constructive program with adequate facilities
and personnel for re-educating and reorganizing
the criminals' attitudes. Motivation, stimulation,
ideas, and patterns of conduct must be provided1 6
Rehabilitation is necessarily an individualistic
approach. People are treated as if their conduct
can be manipulated and controlled. There will be
unequal treatment for offenses which are similar,
which may be resented by the offender as a viola-
tion of equal protection. Since the individual will
be punished for what he is or is believed to be rather
than for what he has done, there is the problem
whether the criminal should be deprived of his
freedom in excess of that which would be taken
were his reform not considered the purpose 7 If
his offense is minor, but the possibility of his
reformation is thought to be difficult and requiring
a great length of time, his punishment may exceed
the nature of his crime. There is also the problem
of giving the proper motivation and insisting on the
goals of normal society, many of which are morally
ambiguous." But by studying each criminal, his
history, associates, environment and mental
15 Privette, supra note I at 67-68.
16 Leopold, supra note 4 at 44-57.
17 Geiber and McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey
of Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis LJ. 491, 504
(1967).
s Id. at 525.
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capacity, society can attempt to guide the criminal standing, the public can also learn to respect the
back to a useful life. law.
PUNISHMENT OR TRtEATMENT?
Retribution and deterrence constitute an
approach, called the legalistic approach, which
believes that the criminal must be made to suffer.
Under this approach, crime is believed to be an
expression of free will. The opposing approach, the
behavioristic approach, believes that crime is a
product of forces not wholly within the control of
the offender. It advocates an inquiry into the
personality and behavior of the criminal so that
society can comprehend the problem and work out
methods of control based on this understanding.19
In both methods, suffering and detention of the
wrongdoer is required; but with retribution and
deterrence it is the primary purpose, while it is
only. incidental to treatment.
Those who advocate the punitive aspect claim
that only through fear of punishment will the
general public be prevented from engaging in
crime. But this ignores the fact that it is not only
the unpleasantness and suffering which deters
crime, but also the stigma which attaches to the
offender for committing the crime.
Most people require the respect and approval
of other members of society. To keep society's
respect, persons will refrain from socially un-
acceptable conduct whether the offender will be
officially treated or punished. Substitution of
treatment for punishment would not result in the
outbreak of crime for group pressure and fear of
loss of status will itself deter crime.20
If treatment is substituted for punishment, there
will not be a return to an era when victims sought
revenge for their injury. The fear that the victim
will take the law into his own hands is based upon
the assumption that the victim demands vengeance
which he will satisfy by himself if society fails to
satisfy it. But these persons would not object to
the criminal being treated, if they understood that
they, society, and the criminal would all benefit.
As long as society is attempting to deal with the
problem and is not allowing the situation to go
unnoticed, it is assumed that this will satisfy the
victim.
Punitive reaction is not the only method of
gaining respect for the laws and protecting the
values of society. By understanding the causes of
crime and controlling crime through this under-
19 RuBI, The Law of Criminal Corrections (1963).
20 SuTHaRLAND, supra note 3 at 314.
Punishment can have an adverse effect upon the
community by isolating the criminal and making
him a confirmed enemy of society.n When he is
isolated from society, neither the criminal nor
society gain an understanding of each other. The
criminal is forced to associate with other criminals
where he can find recognition and prestige. After
serving his sentence he is released to society
physically, but does not rejoin it socially. The
punished person feels a sense of alienation from all
normal activity and this serves to intensify his
instincts to get even with society. If the offenders
are to be turned into law-abiding citizens, they
must be assimilated into society and treated as
persons with such potential. If the prisoner leaves
prison with a feeling of bitterness and hated, or a
desire to take revenge upon society for making him
suffer, then punishment has failed.
Even if some acts are prevented by punishment,
this may not prove that the punishment has
promoted social welfare. While a person may learn
to fear the punishment, he may also learn to fear
the punisher and thus become estranged or
alienated from society. Punishment, while in some
aspects creating respect for the law, may also
create lack of respect for law and lack of initiative
and self respect.n
If only the punitive aspect of punishment is
considered, the situation which caused the crime is
ignored and remains the same as before the
punishment was inflicted. Punishment often-stops
constructive efforts. The criminal is locked up and
forgotten. Even if he repents and is resolved to
reform his ways, he must be helped to accomplish
these good intentions. Treatment involves not
only a determination to change one's behavior, but
a constructive process of organizing and reorganiz-
ing behavior and assimilation into the group.
CONCLUSION
Society can protect itself in three ways. It can
protect itself by permanently isolating the offender.
This will not make the individual a useful member
of society, but it will protect the group by in-
capacitating him. Secondly, society can attempt to
return the criminal to the community with respect
and appreciation of the conventional values. Third,
society can deal with causations of crime and
attempt to prevent crimes from incurring. Neither
21 RUBIN, supra note 19 at 664.
2SUTHERLAND, supra note 3 at 317.
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